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Abstract—We present PoWerStore, the first efficient robust
storage protocol that achieves optimal latency without using
digital signatures.
PoWerStore’s robustness comprises tolerating asynchrony,
maximum number of Byzantine storage servers, any number
of Byzantine readers and crash-faulty writers, and guaranteeing
wait-freedom and linearizability of read/write operations. Further-
more, PoWerStore’s efficiency stems from combining lightweight
authentication, erasure coding and metadata write-backs where
readers write-back only metadata to achieve linearizability.
At the heart of PoWerStore are Proofs of Writing (PoW):
a novel storage technique based on lightweight cryptography.
PoW enable reads and writes in the single-writer variant of
PoWerStore to have latency of 2 rounds of communication
between a client and storage servers in the worst-case (which
we show optimal).
We further present and implement a multi-writer PoWerStore
variant featuring 3-round writes/reads where the third read
round is invoked only under active attacks, and show that it
outperforms existing robust storage protocols, including crash-
tolerant ones.
I. INTRODUCTION
Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) distributed protocols have
recently been attracting considerable research attention, due
to their appealing promise of masking various system issues
ranging from simple crashes, through software bugs and mis-
configurations, all the way to intrusions and malware. How-
ever, there are many issues that render the use of existing BFT
protocols questionable in practice; these include, e.g., weak
guarantees under failures (e.g., [5], [13], [45]) or high cost
in performance, deployment and maintenance when compared
to crash-tolerant protocols [30]. This can help us derive the
following requirements for the design of future BFT protocols:
• A BFT protocol should be robust, i.e., it should tolerate
actual Byzantine faults and actual asynchrony (model-
ing network outages) while maintaining correctness and
providing sustainable progress even under worst-case
conditions that still meet the protocol assumptions. This
requirement has often been neglected in BFT protocols
that focus primarily on common, failure-free operation
modes (e.g., [22], [24], [29]).
• A robust protocol should be efficient (e.g., [17], [48]).
We believe that the efficiency of a robust BFT protocol
is best compared to the efficiency of its crash-tolerant
counterpart. Ideally, a robust protocol should not incur
significant performance and resource cost penalty with
respect to a crash-tolerant implementation, hence making
the replacement of a crash-tolerant protocol a viable
option.
We stand to the point that achieving these goals may
require challenging existing approaches and revisiting the use
of fundamental abstractions (such as cryptographic primitives).
In this paper, we focus on read/write storage [31], where
a set of client (readers and writers) processes share data
leveraging a set of storage server processes. Besides being
fundamental, the read/write storage abstraction is also practi-
cally appealing given that it lies at the heart of the Key-Value
Store (KVS) APIs — a de-facto standard of modern cloud
storage offerings.
In this context, we tackle the problem of developing a
robust and efficient asynchronous distributed storage protocol.
More specifically, storage robustness implies [6]: (i) wait-
freedom [25], i.e., read/write operations invoked by correct
clients always eventually return, and (ii) optimal resilience,
i.e., ensuring correctness despite the largest possible number
t of Byzantine server failures; in the Byzantine model, this
mandates using 3t+ 1 servers [40].
Our main contribution is PoWerStore, the first efficient
robust storage protocol that achieves optimal latency, mea-
sured in maximum (worst-case) number of communication
rounds between a client and storage servers, without using
digital signatures. Perhaps surprisingly, the efficiency of PoW-
erStore does not come from sacrificing consistency; namely,
PoWerStore ensures linearizability [27] (or atomicity [31]) of
read/write operations. In fact, the efficiency of PoWerStore
stems from combining lightweight authentication, erasure
coding and metadata write-backs where readers write-back
only metadata, avoiding much expensive data write-backs.
At the heart of PoWerStore is a novel data storage tech-
nique we call Proofs of Writing (PoW). PoW are inspired by
commitment schemes [23]; PoW incorporate a 2-round write
procedure, where the second round of write effectively serves
to “prove” that the first round has actually been completed
before it is exposed to a reader. More specifically, PoW rely on
the construction of a secure token that is committed in the first
write round, but can only be verified after it is revealed in the
second round. Here, token security means that the adversary
cannot predict nor forge the token before the start of the
second round. We construct PoW using cryptographic hash
functions and efficient message authentication codes (MACs);
in addition, we also propose an instantiation of PoW using
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [43].
As a result, PoW allow PoWerStore to achieve 2-round
read/write operations in the single writer (SW) case. This,
in case of reads, matches the theoretical minimum for any
robust atomic storage implementation that supports arbitrary
number of readers, including crash-only implementations [15].
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Notably, PoWerStore is the first robust BFT storage protocol to
achieve the 2-round latency of reading without using digital
signatures. On the other hand, we prove the 2-round write
inherent, by showing a 2-round write lower bound for any
robust BFT storage that features metadata write-backs using
less than 4t+ 1 storage servers.
In addition, PoWerStore employs erasure coding at the
client side to offload the storage servers and to reduce the
amount of data transferred over the network. Besides being
the first robust BFT storage protocol to feature metadata write-
backs, PoWerStore is also the first robust BFT storage protocol
to tolerate an unbounded number of Byzantine readers [34] and
unbounded number of writers’ crash-faults.
Finally, while our SW variant of PoWerStore demonstrates
the utility of PoW, for practical applications we propose
a multi-writer (MW) variant of PoWerStore (referred to as
M-PoWerStore). M-PoWerStore features 3-round writes and
reads, where the third read round is invoked only under active
attacks. M-PoWerStore also resists attacks specific to multi-
writer setting that exhaust the timestamp domain [7]. We
evaluate M-PoWerStore and demonstrate its superiority even
with respect to existing crash-tolerant robust atomic storage
implementations. Our results show that in typical settings, the
peak throughput achieved by M-PoWerStore improves over
existing crash-tolerant [6] and Byzantine-tolerant [39] atomic
storage implementations, by 50% and 100%, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we outline our system model. In Section III,
we introduce PoWerStore and we analyze its correctness. In
Section IV, we present the multi-writer variant of PoWerStore,
M-PoWerStore. In Section V, we evaluate an implementation
of M-PoWerStore. In Section VI, we overview related work
and we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a distributed system that consists of three
disjoint sets of processes: a set servers of size S = 3t + 1,
where t is the failure threshold parameter, containing processes
{s1, ..., sS}; a collection writers w1, w2, ... and a collection
readers r1, r2, .... The collection clients is the union of writers
and readers. We assume the data-centric model [11], [12], [44]
where every client may asynchronously communicate with any
server by message passing using point-to-point reliable com-
munication channels; however, servers cannot communicate
among each other, nor send messages to clients other than in
reply to clients’ messages.
We further assume that each server si pre-shares one
symmetric group key with all writers in the set W ; in the
following, we denote this key by ki. In addition, we assume
the existence of a cryptographic (i.e., one way and collision
resistant) hash function H(·), and a secure message authenti-
cation function MACk(·), where k is a λ-bit symmetric key.
We model processes as probabilistic I/O automata [49]
where a distributed algorithm is a collection of such pro-
cesses. Processes that follow the algorithm are called correct.
We assume that any number of readers exhibit Byzantine
[32] (or arbitrary [28]) faults. Moreover, up to t servers
may be Byzantine. Byzantine processes can exhibit arbitrary
behavior; however, we assume that Byzantine processes are
computationally bounded and cannot break cryptographic hash
functions or forge message authentication codes. Finally, any
number of writers may fail by crashing.
We focus on a read/write storage abstraction [31] which
exports two operations: WRITE(v), which stores value v and
READ(), which returns the stored value. While every client
may invoke the READ operation, we assume that WRITEs are
invoked only by writers. We say that an operation (invocation)
op is complete if the client receives the response, i.e., if the
client returns from the invocation. We further assume that each
correct client invokes at most one operation at a time (i.e., does
not invoke the next operation until it receives the response for
the current operation). We further assume that the initial value
of a storage is a special value ⊥, which is not a valid input
value for a write operation.
In any execution of an algorithm, we say that a complete
operation op1 precedes operation op2 (or op2 follows op1) if
the response of op1 precedes the invocation of op2 in that
execution.
We focus on the strongest storage progress consistency and
progress semantics, namely linearizability [27] (or atomicity
[31]) and wait-freedom [25]. Wait-freedom states that if a
correct client invokes an operation op, then op eventually
completes. Linearizability gives an illusion that a complete
operation op by a correct client is executed instantly at some
point in time between its invocation and response, whereas the
operations invoked by faulty clients appear either as complete
or not invoked at all.
Finally, we measure the time-complexity of an atomic
storage implementation in terms of number of communication
round-trips (or simply rounds) between a client and servers.
Intuitively, a round consists of a client sending the message to
(a subset of) servers and receiving replies. A formal definition
can be found in, e.g., [15], [18].
III. POWERSTORE
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the
PoWerStore protocol and we analyze its correctness. In addi-
tion, we show that PoWerStore exhibits optimal (worst-case)
latency in both READ and WRITE operations.
A. Proofs of Writing
At the heart of PoWerStore is a novel technique we call
Proofs of Writing (PoW). Intuitively, PoW enable PoWerStore
to complete in a 2-round WRITE procedure, where the second
round of WRITE effectively serves to “prove” that the data
is written in a quorum of servers (at least S − t) before it
is exposed to a client. As such, PoW obviate the need for
writing-back data, enabling efficient metadata write-backs and
support for Byzantine readers.
PoW are inspired by commitment schemes [23]; PoW
consist of the construction of a secure token that can only be
verified after the second round is invoked. Here, token security
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means that the adversary cannot predict nor forge the token
before the start of the second round. More specifically, our
PoW implementation relies on the use of one-way collision-
resistant functions seeded with pseudo-random input. We
construct PoW as follows.
In the first round, the writer first generates a pseudo-random
nonce and stores the hash of the nonce together with the data
in a quorum of servers. The writer then discloses the nonce to
the servers in the second round; this nonce provides sufficient
proof that the first round has actually completed. In fact,
during the first round of a READ operation, the client collects
the received nonces into a set and sends (writes-back) this set
to the servers in the second round. The server then verifies the
PoW by checking whether the received nonce matches the hash
of the stored nonce. Note that since the writer keeps the nonce
secret until the start of the second round, it is computationally
infeasible for the adversary to acquire the nonce unless the
first round of WRITE has been completed.
PoW are not restricted to the use of cryptographic hash
functions. In Section III-F, we propose another possible in-
stantiation of PoW using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [43].
B. Overview of PoWerStore
In PoWerStore, the WRITE operation completes in two
rounds, called STORE and COMPLETE. Likewise, the READ
performs in two rounds, called COLLECT and FILTER. For the
sake of convenience, each round rnd ∈ {STORE, COMPLETE,
COLLECT, FILTER} is wrapped by a procedure rnd. In each
round rnd, the client sends a message of type rnd to all
servers. A round completes at the latest when the client
receives messages of type rnd ACK from S−t correct servers.
The server maintains a variable lc to store the timestamp of
the last completed WRITE, and a variable LC, of the same
structure, to maintain a set of timestamps written-back by
clients. In addition, the server keeps a variable Hist storing
the history of the data written by the writer in the STORE
round, indexed by timestamp.
C. WRITE Implementation
The WRITE implementation is given in Algorithm 1. To
write a value V , the writer1 increases its timestamp ts, com-
putes a nonce N and its hash N = H(N), and invokes STORE
with ts, V and N . When the STORE procedure returns, the
writer invokes COMPLETE with ts and N . After COMPLETE
returns, the WRITE completes.
In STORE, the writer encodes V into S fragments fri (1 ≤
i ≤ S), such that V can be recovered from any subset of t+1
fragments. Furthermore, the writer computes a cross-checksum
cc consisting of the hashes of each fragment. For each server
si (1 ≤ i ≤ S), the writer sends a STORE〈ts, fri, cc,N〉
message to si. On reception of such a message, the server
writes (fri, cc,N) into the history entry Hist[ts] and replies
to the writer. After the writer receives S − t replies from
different servers, the STORE procedure returns, and the writer
proceeds to COMPLETE.
1Recall that PoWerStore is a single-writer storage protocol.
1: Definitions:
2: ts : structure num initially ts = ts0 , 0
3: operation WRITE(V )
4: ts← ts+ 1
5: N ← {0, 1}λ
6: N ← H(N)
7: STORE(ts,N, V )
8: COMPLETE(ts,N)
9: return OK
10: procedure STORE(ts, V,N )
11: {fr1, . . . , frS} ← encode(V, t+ 1, S)
12: cc← [H(fr1), . . . , H(frS)]
13: for 1 ≤ i ≤ S do send STORE〈ts, fri, cc,N〉 to si
14: wait for STORE ACK〈ts〉 from S − t servers
15: procedure COMPLETE(ts,N )
16: send COMPLETE〈ts,N〉 to all servers
17: wait for COMPLETE ACK〈ts〉 from S − t servers
Algorithm 1: Algorithm of the writer in PoWerStore.
In COMPLETE, the writer sends a COMPLETE〈ts,N〉 mes-
sage to all servers. Upon reception of such a message, the
server changes the value of lc to (ts,N) if ts > lc.ts and
replies to the writer. After the writer receives S − t replies
from different servers, the COMPLETE procedure returns.
D. READ Implementation
The READ implementation is given in Algorithm 3; it
consists of the COLLECT procedure followed by the FILTER
procedure. In COLLECT, the client reads the tuples (ts,N)
included in the set LC ∪ {lc} at the server, and accumulates
these tuples in a set C together with the tuples read from other
servers. We call such a tuple a candidate and C a candidate
set. Before responding to the client, the server garbage-collects
old tuples in LC using the GC procedure. After the client
receives candidates from S − t different servers, COLLECT
returns.
In FILTER, the client submits C to each server. Upon
reception of C, the server performs a write-back of the
candidates in C (metadata write-back). In addition, the server
picks chv as the candidate with the highest timestamp in C
such that valid(chv) holds. The predicate valid(c) holds if the
server, based on the history, is able to verify the integrity of
c by checking that H(c.N) equals Hist[c.ts].N . The server
then responds to the client with a message including the
timestamp chv.ts, the fragment Hist[chv.ts].fr and the cross-
checksum Hist[chv.ts].cc. The client waits for the responses
from servers until there is a candidate c with the highest
timestamp in C such that safe(c) holds, or until C is empty,
after which COLLECT returns. The predicate safe(c) holds
if at least t + 1 different servers si have responded with
timestamp c.ts, fragment fri and cross-checksum cc such that
H(fri) = cc[i]. If C 6= ∅, the client selects the candidate with
the highest timestamp c ∈ C and restores value V by decoding
V from the t+1 correct fragments received for c. Otherwise,
the client sets V to the initial value ⊥. Finally, the READ
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18: Definitions:
19: lc : structure (ts,N), initially (ts0, NULL) //last completed write
20: LC : set of structure (ts,N), initially ∅ //set of written-back candidates
21: Hist[. . . ] : vector of (fr, cc,N) indexed by ts, initially Hist[ts0] = (NULL, NULL, NULL)
22: upon receiving STORE〈ts, fr, cc,N〉 from the writer
23: Hist[ts]← (fr, cc,N)
24: send STORE ACK〈ts〉 to the writer
25: upon receiving COMPLETE〈ts,N〉 from the writer
26: if ts > lc.ts then lc← (ts,N)
27: send COMPLETE ACK〈ts〉 to the writer
28: procedure GC()
29: chv ← c0
30: chv ← c ∈ LC : c=max({c ∈ LC : valid(c)})
31: if chv.ts > lc.ts then lc← chv
32: LC ← {c ∈ LC : c.ts > lc.ts ∧Hist[c.ts] = NULL}
33: upon receiving COLLECT〈tsr〉 from client r
34: GC()
35: send COLLECT ACK〈tsr, LC ∪ {lc}〉 to client r
36: upon receiving FILTER〈tsr, C〉 from client r
37: LC ← LC ∪ C //write-back
38: chv ← c0
39: chv ← c ∈ C : c=max({c ∈ C : valid(c)})
40: (fr, cc)← (Hist[chv.ts].fr,Hist[chv.ts].cc)
41: send FILTER ACK〈tsr, chv.ts, fr, cc〉 to client r
42: Predicates:
43: valid(c) , (H(c.N) = Hist[c.ts].N)
Algorithm 2: Algorithm of server si in PoWerStore.
returns V .
E. Correctness Sketch
In what follows, we show that PoWerStore satisfies lineariz-
ability and wait-freedom in all FILTER. Due to lack of space,
we refer the readers to the Appendix for a detailed proof of
PoWerStore’s correctness.
We first explain why linearizability is satisfied by arguing
that if a READ follows after a completed WRITE(V ) (resp.
a completed READ that returns V ) then the READ does not
return a value older than V .
a) READ/ WRITE Linearizability: Suppose a READ
rd by a correct client follows after a completed WRITE(V ).
If ts is the timestamp of WRITE(V ), we argue that rd
does not select a candidate with a timestamp lower than ts.
Since a correct server never changes lc to a candidate with a
lower timestamp, after WRITE(V ) completed, t + 1 correct
servers hold a valid candidate with timestamp ts or greater in
lc. Hence, during COLLECT in rd, a valid candidate c with
timestamp ts or greater is included in C. Since c is valid,
at least t + 1 correct servers hold history entries matching c
and none of them respond with a timestamp lower than c.ts.
Consequently, at most 2t timestamps received by the client
in FILTER are lower than c.ts and thus c is never excluded
from C. By Algorithm 3, rd does not select a candidate with
timestamp lower than c.ts ≥ ts.
b) READ Linearizability: Suppose a READ rd′ by a
correct client follows after rd. If c is the candidate selected
in rd, we argue that rd′ does not select a candidate with a
timestamp lower than c.ts. By the time rd completes, t + 1
correct servers hold c in LC. According to Algorithm 2, if a
correct server excludes c from LC, then the server changed lc
to a valid candidate with timestamp c.ts or greater. As such,
t+1 correct servers hold in LC ∪{lc} a valid candidate with
timestamp c.ts or greater and during COLLECT in rd′, a valid
candidate c′ with timestamp c.ts or greater is included in C.
By applying the same arguments as above, rd does not select
a candidate with timestamp lower than c′.ts ≥ c.ts.
We now show that PoWerStore satisfies wait-freedom; here,
we argue that the READ does not block in FILTER while
waiting for the candidate c with the highest timestamp in C
to become safe(c) or C to become empty.
c) Wait-freedom: Suppose by contradiction that rd
blocks during FILTER after receiving FILTER ACK messages
from all correct servers. We distinguish two cases: (Case 1) C
contains a valid candidate and (Case 2) C contains no valid
candidate.
• Case 1: Let c be the valid candidate with the highest
timestamp in C. As c is valid, at least t + 1 correct
servers hold history entries matching c. Since no valid
candidate in C has a higher timestamp than c.ts, these
t + 1 correct servers responded with timestamp c.ts,
corresponding erasure coded fragment fri and cross-
checksum cc such that H(fri) = cc[i]. Therefore, c is
safe(c). Furthermore, all correct servers (at least S − t)
responded with timestamps at most c.ts. Hence, every
candidate c′ ∈ C such that c′.ts > c.ts becomes
invalid(c′) and is excluded from C. As such, c is also
highcand(c) and we conclude that rd does not block.
• Case 2: Since none of the candidates in C is valid, all
correct servers (at least S− t) responded with timestamp
ts0, which is lower than any candidate timestamp. As
such, every candidate c ∈ C becomes invalid(c) is
excluded from C. We therefore conclude that rd does
not block.
F. PoW based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
In what follows, we propose an alternative construction of
PoW based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [43]. Here,
the writer constructs a polynomial P (·) of degree t with
coefficients {αt, . . . , α0} chosen at random from Zq , where q
is a public parameter. That is, P (x) =
∑j=t
j=0 αjx
j .
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44: Definitions:
45: tsr: num, initially 0
46: Q,R: set of pid, initially ∅
47: C: set of (ts,N), initially ∅
48: W [1 . . . S]: vector of (ts, fr, cc), initially []
49: operation READ()
50: C,Q,R← ∅
51: tsr ← tsr + 1
52: C ← COLLECT(tsr)
53: C ← FILTER(tsr, C)
54: if C 6= ∅ then
55: c← c′ ∈ C : highcand(c′) ∧ safe(c′)
56: V ← RESTORE(c.ts)
57: else V ← ⊥
58: return V
59: procedure COLLECT(tsr)
60: send COLLECT〈tsr〉 to all servers
61: wait until |Q| ≥ S − t
62: return C
63: upon receiving COLLECT ACK〈tsr, Ci〉 from server si
64: Q← Q ∪ {i}
65: C ← C ∪ {c ∈ Ci : c.ts > ts0}
66: procedure FILTER(tsr, C)
67: send FILTER〈tsr, C〉 to all servers
68: wait until |R| ≥ S − t ∧
((∃c ∈ C : highcand(c) ∧ safe(c)) ∨ C = ∅)
69: return C
70: upon receiving FILTER ACK〈tsr, ts, fr, cc〉 from server si
71: R← R ∪ {i}; W [i]← (ts, fr, cc)
72: C ← C \ {c ∈ C : invalid(c)}
73: procedure RESTORE(ts)
74: cc← cc′ s.t. ∃R′ ⊆ R : |R′| ≥ t+ 1 ∧
(∀i ∈ R′ :W [i].ts = ts ∧W [i].cc = cc′)
75: F ← {W [i].fr : i∈R ∧W [i].ts=ts ∧H(W [i].fr)=cc[i]}
76: V ← decode(F, t+ 1, S)
77: return V
78: Predicates:
79: highcand(c) , (c.ts = max({c′.ts : c′ ∈ C}))
80: safe(c) , ∃R′ ⊆ R : |R′| ≥ t+ 1 ∧
(∀i ∈ R′ :W [i].ts = c.ts) ∧
(∀i, j ∈ R′:W [i].cc=W [j].cc ∧H(W [i].fr)=W [j].cc[i])
81: invalid(c) , |{i ∈ R :W [i].ts < c.ts}| ≥ S − t
Algorithm 3: Algorithm of client r in PoWerStore.
The writer then constructs the PoW as follows: for each
server si, the writer picks a random point xi, and constructs
the share (xi, Pi), where Pi = P (xi). As such, the writer
constructs S different shares, one for each server, and sends
a STORE〈ts, fri, cc, xi, Pi〉 message to each server si over a
confidential channel. Upon reception of such a message, server
si stores (fri, cc, xi, Pi) in Hist[ts]. Note that since there are
at most t Byzantine servers, these servers cannot reconstruct
the polynomial P (·) from their shares, even if they collude. In
the COMPLETE round, the writer reveals the polynomial P (·)
in a COMPLETE〈ts, P (·)〉 message. This enables a client to
determine for a candidate c = (ts, P (·)) that the corresponding
STORE round completed by checking that t + 1 servers si
stored (xi, P (xi)), without the servers revealing their share.
For this purpose, the valid predicate at server si changes to
valid(c) , (c.P (Hist[c.ts].xi) = Hist[c.ts].Pi).
By relying on randomly chosen xi, and the fact that correct
servers never divulge their share, our construction prevents an
adversary from fabricating a partially corrupted polynomial
after the disclosure of P (·). To see why, note that with the
knowledge of P (·) and xi held by a correct server si, the
adversary could fabricate a partially corrupted polynomial ˆP (·)
that intersects with P (·) only at xi (i.e., P (xi) = ˆP (xi)). This
would lead to a situation in which a candidate c is neither
safe(c) nor invalid(c) and thus, the READ would block.
We point that, unlike the solution based on hash functions,
this construction provides information-theoretic guarantees for
the PoW [4], [33] during the STORE round.
G. Optimality of PoWerStore
In this section, we prove that PoWerStore features optimal
WRITE latency, by showing that writing in two rounds is
necessary. We start by giving some informal definitions.
A distributed algorithm A is a collection of automata [36],
where automaton Ap is assigned to process p. Computation
proceeds in steps of A and a run is an infinite sequence of
steps of A. A partial run is a finite prefix of some run. We
say that a (partial) run r extends some partial run pr if pr is
a prefix of r.
We say that an implementation of linearizable storage is
selfish, if readers write-back only metadata instead of the full
value. Intuitively the readers are selfish because they do not
help the writer complete a write. For a formal definition, we
refer the readers to [16]. Furthermore, we say that a WRITE
operation is fast if it completes in a single round. We now
proceed to proving the main result.
Theorem III.1. There is no fast WRITE implementation I of
a multi-reader selfish robust linearizable storage that makes
use of less than 4t+ 1 servers.
Preliminaries. We prove Theorem III.1 by contradiction as-
suming at most 4t servers. We partition the set of servers into
four distinct subsets (we call blocks), denoted by T1, T2, T3
each of size exactly t, and T4 of size at least 1 and at most t.
Without loss of generality we assume that each block contains
at least one server. We say that an operation op skips a block
Ti, (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) when all messages by op to Ti are delayed
indefinitely (due to asynchrony) and all other blocks Tj receive
all messages by op and reply.
Proof: We construct a series of runs of a linearizable imple-
mentation I towards a partial run that violates linearizability.
• Let run1 be the partial run in which all servers are correct
except T1 which crashed at the beginning of run1. Let
wr be the operation invoked by the writer w to write a
value v 6= ⊥ in the storage. The WRITE wr is the only
operation invoked in run1 and w crashes after writing v
to T3. Hence, wr skips blocks T1, T2 and T4.
• Let run′1 be the partial run in which all servers are correct
except T4, which crashed at the beginning of run′1. In
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...
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......
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wr(v) rd1 → v rd2 → v′
(f) run6
Fig. 1. Sketch of the runs used in the proof of Theorem III.1.
run′1, w is correct and wr completes by writing v to all
blocks except T4, which it skips.
• Let run2 be the partial run similar to run′1, in which all
servers except T2 are correct, but due to asynchrony, all
messages from w to T4 are delayed. Like in run′1, wr
completes by writing v to all servers except T4, which it
skips. To see why, note that wr cannot distinguish run2
from run′1. After wr completes, T2 fails Byzantine by
reverting its memory to the initial state.
• Let run3 extend run1 by appending a complete READ
rd1 invoked by r1. By our assumption, I is wait-free. As
such, rd1 completes by skipping T1 (because T1 crashed)
and returns (after a finite number of rounds) a value vR.
• Let run4 extend run2 by appending rd1. In run4, all
servers except T2 are correct, but due to asynchrony
all messages from r1 to T1 are delayed indefinitely.
Moreover, since T2 reverted its memory to the initial
state, v is held only by T3. Note that r1 cannot distinguish
run4 from run3 in which T1 has crashed. As such, rd1
completes by skipping T1 and returns vR. By lineariz-
ability, vR = v.
• Let run5 be similar to run3 in which all servers except
T3 are correct but, due to asynchrony, all messages from
r1 to T1 are delayed. Note that r1 cannot distinguish run5
from run3. As such, rd1 returns vR in run5, and by
run4, vR = v. After rd1 completes, T3 fails by crashing.
• Let run6 extend run5 by appending a READ rd2
invoked by r2 that completes by returning v′. Note that
in run5, (i) T3 is the only server to which v was written,
(ii) rd1 did not write-back v (to any other server) before
returning v, and (iii) T3 crashed before rd2 is invoked.
As such, rd2 does not find v in any server and hence
v′ 6= v, violating linearizability.
Notice that Theorem III.1 applies even to implementations
relying on self-verifying data and/or not tolerating Byzantine
readers. Furthermore, the proof extends to crash-tolerant stor-
age when deleting the Byzantine block T2 in the above proof;
the result being that there is no selfish implementation of a
multi-reader crash-tolerant linearizable storage with less than
3t+ 1 servers in which every WRITE is fast.
IV. M-POWERSTORE
The PoWerStore protocol, as presented in Section III, has
a drawback in having potentially very large candidate sets
that servers send to clients and that clients write-back to
servers. As a result, a malicious adversary can exploit the
fact that in PoWerStore candidate sets can (theoretically) grow
without bounds and mount a denial of service (DoS) attack by
fabricating huge sets of bogus candidates. While this attack
can be contained by a robust implementation of the point-
to-point channel assumption using, e.g., a separate pair of
network cards for each channel (in the vein of [13]), this may
impact practicality of PoWerStore. To rectify this issue, and
for practical applications, we propose a multi-writer variant of
our protocol called M-PoWerStore.
A. Overview
M-PoWerStore (Algorithms 4, 5 and 6) supports an un-
bounded number of clients. In addition, M-PoWerStore fea-
tures optimal READ latency of two rounds in the common
case, where no process is Byzantine. Outside the common
case, under active attacks, M-PoWerStore gracefully degrades
to guarantee reading in at most three rounds. The WRITE has
a latency of three rounds, featuring non-skipping timestamps
[7], which prevents attacks specific to multi-writer setting that
exhaust the timestamp domain.
The main difference between M-PoWerStore and PoWer-
Store is that, here, servers keep a single written-back candidate
instead of a set. To this end, it is crucial that servers are
able to determine the validity of a written-back candidate
without consulting the history. For this purpose, we enhance
our original PoW scheme by extending the candidate with
message authentication codes (MACs) to authenticate the
timestamp and the nonce’s hash, one for each server, using
the corresponding group key. As such, a valid MAC proves
to a server that the timestamp has been issued by a writer
in COMPLETE, and thus, constitutes a PoW that a server can
obtain even without the corresponding history entry. Note that
in case of a candidate incorporating corrupted MACs, servers
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might disagree about the validity of a written-back candidate.
Hence, a correct client might not be able to write-back a
candidate to t + 1 correct servers as needed. To solve this
issue, M-PoWerStore ”pre-writes” the MACs in the STORE
round, enabling the client to repair the broken MACs of a
selected candidate. We point out that the adversary cannot
forge the MACs (and therefore bypass the PoW) before the
start of the COMPLETE, since the constructed MACs, besides
the timestamp, also include the nonce’s hash.
To support multiple-writers, WRITE in M-PoWerStore
comprises an additional clock synchronization round, called
CLOCK, which is prepended to STORE. The READ performs
an additional round called REPAIR, which is appended to
COLLECT. The purpose of REPAIR is to repair and write-back
candidates if necessary, and is invoked only under active attack
by a malicious adversary that actually corrupts candidates.
Similarly to PoWerStore, the server maintains the variable
Hist to store the history of the data written by the writer
in the STORE round, indexed by timestamp. In addition, the
server keeps the variable lc to store the timestamp of the last
completed write.
B. WRITE Implementation
The full WRITE implementation is given in Algorithm 4.
In the following, we simply highlight the differences to
PoWerStore.
As outlined before, M-PoWerStore is resilient to the ad-
versary skipping timestamps. This is achieved by having the
writer authenticate the timestamp of a WRITE with a key kW
shared among the writers. Note that such a shared key can be
obtained by combining the different group keys; for instance,
kW ← H(k1||k2|| . . . ).
To obtain a timestamp, in the CLOCK procedure, the writer
retrieves the timestamp (held in variable lc) from a quorum of
S − t servers and picks the highest timestamp ts with a valid
MAC. Then, the writer increases ts and computes a MAC for
ts using kW . Finally, CLOCK returns ts.
To write a value V , the writer, (i) obtains a timestamp
ts from the CLOCK procedure, (ii) authenticates ts and the
nonce’s hash N by a vector of MACs vec, with one en-
try for each server si using group key ki, and (iii) stores
vec both in STORE and COMPLETE. Upon reception of a
STORE〈fri, cc,N, vec〉 message, the server writes the tuple
(fri, cc,N, vec) into the history entry Hist[ts]. Upon recep-
tion of a COMPLETE〈ts,N, vec〉 message, the server changes
the value of lc to (ts,N, vec) if ts > lc.ts.
C. READ Implementation
The full READ implementation is given in Algorithm 3.
The READ consists of three consecutive rounds, COLLECT,
FILTER and REPAIR. In COLLECT, a client reads the candidate
triple (ts,K, vec) stored in variable lc in the server, and inserts
it into the candidate set C together with the candidates read
from other servers. After the client receives S − t candidates
from different servers, COLLECT returns.
82: Definitions:
83: Q: set of pid, (process id) initially ∅
84: ts: structure (num, pid,MAC{kW }(num||pid)),
initially ts0 , (0, 0, NULL)
85: operation WRITE(V )
86: Q← ∅
87: ts← CLOCK()
88: N ← {0, 1}λ
89: N ← H(N)
90: vec← [MAC{ki}(ts||N)1≤i≤S ]
91: STORE(ts, V,N, vec)
92: COMPLETE(ts,N, vec)
93: return OK
94: procedure CLOCK()
95: send CLOCK〈ts〉 to all servers
96: wait until |Q| ≥ S − t
97: ts.num← ts.num+ 1
98: ts← (ts.num,w,MAC{kW }(ts.num||w))
99: return ts
100: upon receiving CLOCK ACK〈ts, tsi〉 from server si
101: Q← Q ∪ {i}
102: if tsi > ts ∧ verify(tsi, kW ) then ts← tsi
103: procedure STORE(ts, V,N, vec)
104: {fr1, . . . , frS} ← encode(V, t+ 1, S)
105: cc← [H(fr1), . . . , H(frS)]
106: foreach server si send STORE〈ts, fri, cc,N, vec〉 to si
107: wait for STORE ACK〈ts〉 from S − t servers
108: procedure COMPLETE(ts,N, vec)
109: send COMPLETE〈ts,N, vec〉 to all servers
110: wait for COMPLETE ACK〈ts〉 from S − t servers
Algorithm 4: Algorithm of writer w in M-PoWerStore.
In FILTER, the client submits C to each server. Upon recep-
tion of C, the server chooses a candidate cwb to write-back,
as the candidate with the highest timestamp in C such that
valid(cwb) holds, and sets lc to cwb if cwb.ts > lc.ts. Roughly
speaking, the predicate valid(c) holds if the server, verifies
the integrity of the timestamp c.ts and nonce c.N either by
the MAC, or by the corresponding history entry. Besides that,
the server chooses a candidate crt to return, as the candidate
with the highest timestamp in C such that validByHist(crt)
holds. The predicate validByHist(c) holds, if the server keeps
a matching history entry for c. The server then responds to
the client with a message including the timestamp crt.ts, the
fragment Hist[crt.ts].fr, the cross-checksum Hist[crt.ts].cc
and the vector of MACs Hist[crt.ts].vec.
The client waits for the responses from servers until there is
a candidate c with the highest timestamp in C such that safe(c)
holds, or until C is empty, after which FILTER returns. The
predicate safe(c) holds if at least t+1 different servers si have
responded with timestamp c.ts, fragment fri, cross-checksum
cc such that H(fri) = cc[i], and vector vec. If C is empty,
the client sets V to the initial value ⊥. Otherwise, the client
selects the highest candidate c ∈ C and restores value V by
decoding V from the t+ 1 correct fragments received for c.
In REPAIR, the client verifies the integrity of c.vec by
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111: Definitions:
112: lc: structure (ts,N, vec), initially c0 , (ts0, NULL, NULL)
113: Hist[. . . ]: vector of (fr, cc,N, vec) indexed by ts, initially Hist[ts0] = (NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
111: upon receiving CLOCK〈ts〉 from writer w
112: send CLOCK ACK〈ts, lc.ts〉 to writer w
113: upon receiving STORE〈ts, fr, cc,N, vec〉
from writer w
114: Hist[ts]← (fr, cc,N, vec)
115: send STORE ACK〈ts〉 to writer w
116: upon receiving COMPLETE〈ts,N, vec〉 from writer w
117: if ts > lc.ts then lc← (ts,N, vec)
118: send COMPLETE ACK〈ts〉 to writer w
119: upon receiving COLLECT〈tsr〉 from client r
120: send COLLECT ACK〈tsr, lc〉 to client r
121: upon receiving FILTER〈tsr, C〉 from client r
122: cwb, crt ← c0
123: cwb ← c ∈ C : c=max({c ∈ C : valid(c)})
124: if cwb.ts > lc.ts then lc← cwb //write-back
125: crt ← c ∈ C : c=max({c ∈ C : validByHist(c)})
126: (fr, cc, vec)← (Hist[crt.ts].fr,Hist[crt.ts].cc,Hist[crt.ts].vec)
127: send FILTER ACK〈tsr, crt.ts, fr, cc, vec〉 to client r
128: upon receiving REPAIR〈tsr, c〉 from client r
129: if c.ts > lc.ts ∧ valid(c) then lc← c
130: send REPAIR ACK〈tsr〉 to client r
131: Predicates:
132: valid(c) , (validByHist(c) ∨ verify(c.vec[i], c.ts,H(c.N), ki))
133: validByHist(c) , (H(c.N) = Hist[c.ts].N )
Algorithm 5: Algorithm of server si in M-PoWerStore.
matching it against the vector vec received from t + 1 dif-
ferent servers. If c.vec and vec match then REPAIR returns.
Otherwise, the client repairs c by setting c.vec to vec and
invokes a round of write-back by sending a REPAIR〈tsr, c〉
message to all servers. Upon reception of such a message,
the server sets lc to c if c.ts > lc.ts and valid(c) holds and
responds with an REPAIR ACK message to the client. Once the
client receives acknowledgements from n−t different servers,
REPAIR returns. After REPAIR returns, the READ returns V .
D. Correctness Sketch
We show that M-PoWerStore satisfies READ linearizability
as follows. We show that if a completed READ rd returns
V then a subsequent READ rd′ does not return a value
older than V . Note that the arguments for READ/WRITE
linearizability and wait-freedom are very similar to those of
PoWerStore (Section III-E), and therefore omitted.
Suppose a READ rd′ by a correct client follows after rd
that returns V . If c is the candidate selected in rd, we argue
that rd′ does not select a candidate with a timestamp lower
than c.ts. Note that besides c being a valid candidate, in
REPAIR, the client also checks the integrity of c.vec. If c.vec
passes the integrity check in rd (line 171 of Algorithm 6),
then the integrity of c has been fully established. Otherwise,
c.vec fails the integrity check. In that case the client repairs c
(line 172 of Algorithm 6) and subsequently writes-back c to
t+1 correct servers. In both cases, t+1 correct servers have
set lc to c or to a valid candidate with a higher timestamp. As
such, during COLLECT in rd′, a valid candidate c′ such that
c′.ts ≥ c.ts is included in C. Since c′ is valid, t + 1 correct
servers hold history entries matching c′ and none of them
responds with a timestamp lower than c′.ts. Consequently,
at most 2t timestamps received by the client in FILTER are
lower than c′.ts and thus c′ is never excluded from C. By
Algorithm 6, rd′ does not select a candidate with timestamp
lower than c′.ts ≥ c.ts.
V. IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
In this section, we describe an implementation modeling
a Key-Value Store (KVS) based on M-PoWerStore. More
specifically, to model a KVS, we use multiple instances
of M-PoWerStore referenced by keys. We then evaluate the
performance of our implementation and we compare it both:
(i) M-ABD, the multi-writer variant of the crash-only atomic
storage protocol of [6], and (ii) Phalanx, the multi-writer
robust atomic protocol of [39].
A. Implementation Setup
Our KVS implementation is based on the JAVA-based
framework Neko [2] that provides support for inter-process
communication, and on the Jerasure [1] library for constructing
the dispersal codes. To evaluate the performance of our M-
PoWerStore we additionally implemented two KVSs based
on M-ABD and Phalanx.
In our implementation, we relied on 160-bit SHA1 for
hashing purposes, 160-bit keyed HMACs to implement MACs,
and 1024-bit DSA to generate signatures. For simplicity,
we abstract away the effect of message authentication in
our implementations; we argue that this does not affect our
performance evaluation since data origin authentication is
typically handled as part of the access control layer in all three
implementations, when deployed in realistic settings (e.g., in
Wide Area Networks).
We deployed our implementations on a private network
consisting of a 4-core Intel Xeon E5443 with 4GB of RAM,
a 4 core Intel i5-3470 with 8 GB of RAM, an 8 Intel-Core
i7-37708 with 8 GB of RAM, and a 64-core Intel Xeon
E5606 equipped with 32GB of RAM. In our network, the
communication between various machines was bridged using
a 1 Gbps switch. All the servers were running in separate
processes on the Xeon E5606 machine, whereas the clients
were distributed among the Xeon E5443, i7, and the i5
machines. Each client invokes operation in a closed loop,
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134: Definitions:
135: tsr: num, initially 0
136: Q,R: set of pid, initially ∅
137: C: set of (ts,N, vec), initially ∅
138: W [1 . . . S]: vector of (ts, fr, cc, vec), initially []
139: operation READ()
140: C,Q,R← ∅
141: tsr ← tsr + 1
142: C ← COLLECT(tsr)
143: C ← FILTER(tsr, C)
144: if C 6= ∅ then
145: c← c′ ∈ C : highcand(c′) ∧ safe(c′)
146: V ← RESTORE(c.ts)
147: REPAIR(c)
148: else V ← ⊥
149: return V
150: procedure COLLECT(tsr)
151: send COLLECT〈tsr〉 to all servers
152: wait until |Q| ≥ S − t
153: return C
154: upon receiving COLLECT ACK〈tsr, ci〉 from server si
155: Q← Q ∪ {i}
156: if ci.ts > ts0 then C ← C ∪ {ci}
157: procedure FILTER(tsr, C)
158: send FILTER〈tsr, C〉 to all servers
159: wait until |R| ≥ S − t ∧
((∃c ∈ C : highcand(c) ∧ safe(c)) ∨ C = ∅)
160: return C
161: upon receiving FILTER ACK〈tsr,ts,fr,cc,vec〉 from server si
162: R← R ∪ {i}; W [i]← (ts, fr, cc, vec)
163: C ← C \ {c ∈ C : invalid(c)}
164: procedure RESTORE(ts)
165: cc← cc′ s.t. ∃R′ ⊆ R : |R′| ≥ t+ 1 ∧
(∀i ∈ R′ :W [i].ts = ts ∧W [i].cc = cc′)
166: F ← {W [i].fr : i∈R∧W [i].ts=ts∧H(W [i].fr)=cc[i]}
167: V ← decode(F, t+ 1, S)
168: return V
169: procedure REPAIR(c)
170: vec← vec′ s.t. ∃R′ ⊆ R : |R′| ≥ t+ 1 ∧
(∀i ∈ R′ :W [i].ts = c.ts ∧W [i].vec = vec′)
171: if c.vec 6= vec then
172: c.vec← vec //repair
173: send REPAIR〈tsr, c〉 to all servers
174: wait for REPAIR ACK〈tsr〉 from S − t servers
175: Predicates:
176: highcand(c) , (c.ts = max({c′.ts : c′ ∈ C}))
177: safe(c) , ∃R′ ⊆ R : |R′| ≥ t+ 1 ∧
(∀i ∈ R′ :W [i].ts = c.ts) ∧
(∀i, j ∈ R′:W [i].cc=W [j].cc ∧H(W [i].fr)=W [j].cc[i])∧
(∀i, j ∈ R′ :W [i].vec =W [j].vec)
178: invalid(c) , |{i ∈ R :W [i].ts < c.ts}| ≥ S − t
Algorithm 6: Algorithm of client r in M-PoWerStore.
i.e., a client may have at most one pending operation. In all
KVS implementations, all WRITE and READ operations are
served by a local database stored on disk.
We evaluate the peak throughput incurred in M-PoWerStore
in WRITE and READ operations, when compared to M-ABD
and Phalanx with respect to: (i) the file size (64 KB, 128 KB,
256 KB, 512 KB, and 1024 KB), and (ii) to the server failure
Parameter Default Value
Failure threshold t 1
File size 256 KB
Probability of Concurrency 1%
Workload Distribution 100% READ /100% WRITE
TABLE I
DEFAULT PARAMETERS USED IN EVALUATION.
threshold t (1, 2, and 3, respectively). For better evaluation
purposes, we vary each variable separately and we fix the
remaining parameters to a default configuration (Table I).
We also evaluate the latency incurred in M-PoWerStore with
respect to the attained throughput.
We measure peak throughput as follows. We require that
each writer performs back to back WRITE operations; we
then increase the number of writers in the system until the
aggregated throughput attained by all writers is saturated. The
peak throughput is then computed as the maximum aggregated
amount of data (in bytes) that can be written/read to the servers
per second.
Each data point in our plots is averaged over 5 inde-
pendent measurements; where appropriate, we include the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals. as data objects. On
the other hand, READ operations request the data pertaining
to randomly-chosen keys. For completeness, we performed our
evaluation (i) in the Local Area Network (LAN) setting com-
prising our aforementioned network (Section V-B) and (ii) in
a simulated Wide Area Network (WAN) setting (Section V-C).
Our evaluation results are presented in Figure 2.
B. Evaluation Results within a LAN Setting
Figure 2(a) depicts the latency incurred in M-PoWerStore
when compared to M-ABD and Phalanx, with respect to the
achieved throughput (measured in the number of operations
per second). Our results show that, by combining meta-
data write-backs with erasure coding, M-PoWerStore achieves
lower latencies than M-ABD and Phalanx for both READ and
WRITE operations. As expected, READ latencies incurred
in PoWerStore are lower than those of WRITE operations
since a WRITE requires an extra communication round cor-
responding to the CLOCK round. Furthermore, due to PoW
and the use of lightweight cryptographic primitives, the READ
performance of PoWerStore considerably outperforms M-ABD
and Phalanx. On the other hand, writing in M-PoWerStore
compares similarly to the writing in M-ABD.
Figure 2(b) depicts the peak throughput achieved in M-
PoWerStore with respect to the number of Byzantine servers
t. As t increases, the gain in peak throughout achieved in
M-PoWerStore’s READ and WRITE increases compared to
M-ABD and Phalanx. This mainly stems from the reliance
on erasure coding, which ensures that the overhead of file
replication among the servers is minimized when compared to
M-ABD and Phalanx. In typical settings, featuring t = 1 and
the default parameters of Table I, the peak throughput achieved
in M-PoWerStore’s READ operation is almost twice as large
as that in M-ABD and Phalanx.
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Fig. 2. Evaluation Results. Data points are averaged over 5 independent runs; where appropriate, we include the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
In Figure 2(c), we measure the peak throughout achieved
in M-PoWerStore with respect to the file size. Our findings
clearly show that as the file size increases, the performance
gain of M-PoWerStore compared to M-ABD and Phalanx
becomes considerable. For example, when the file size is 1
MB, the peak throughput of READ and WRITE operations
in M-PoWerStore approaches the (network-limited) bounds of
50 MB/s2 and 45 MB/s, respectively.
C. Evaluation Results within a Simulated WAN Setting
We now proceed to evaluate the performance of M-
PoWerStore when deployed in WAN settings. For that purpose,
we rely on a 100 Mbps switch to bridge the network outlined
in Section V-A and we rely on NetEm [41] to emulate the
packet delay variance specific to WANs. More specifically,
we add a Pareto distribution to our links, with a mean of 20
ms and a variance of 4 ms.
We then measure the latency incurred in M-PoWerStore
in the emulated WAN setting. Our measurement results (Fig-
2Note that an effective peak throughout of 50MB/s in M-PoWerStore
reflects an actual throughput of almost 820 Mbps when t = 1.
ure 2(d)) confirm our previous analysis conducted in the LAN
scenario and demonstrate the superior performance of M-
PoWerStore compared to M-ABD and Phalanx in realistic
settings. Here, we point out that the performance of M-
PoWerStore incurred in both READ and WRITE operations
does not deteriorate as the number of Byzantine servers in the
system increases. This is mainly due to the reliance on erasure
coding. In fact, the overhead of transmitting an erasure-coded
file F to the 3t+1 servers, with a reconstruction threshold of
t+1 is given by 3t+1t+1 |F |. It is easy to see that, as t increases,
this overhead is asymptotically increases towards 3|F |.
VI. RELATED WORK
A seminal crash-tolerant robust linearizable read/write stor-
age implementation assuming a majority of correct processes
was presented in [6]. In the original single-writer variant of
[6], read operations always take 2 rounds between a client and
servers with data write-backs in the second round. On the other
hand all write operations complete in a single round; in the
multi-writer variant [35], the second write round is necessary.
Server state modifications by readers introduced by [6] are
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unavoidable; namely, [16] showed a t+1 lower bound on the
number of servers that a reader has to modify in any wait-free
linearizable storage. However, robust storage implementations
differ in the strategy employed by readers: in some protocols
readers write-back data (e.g., [4], [6], [14], [18], [22], [39])
whereas in others readers only write metadata to servers (e.g.,
[10], [15], [16]).
The only two asynchronous storage protocols that feature
metadata write-backs are multi-writer crash-tolerant protocols
of [16] and [10] that are both also linearizable, wait-free and
optimally resilient. The read/write protocol of [16] fails to
achieve optimal latency featuring 3-round writes and reads.
Vivace [10] is a key-value storage system tailored for WANs
(geo-replication); it features 3-round reads and 2-round writes,
saving on a communication round by relying on synchronized
clocks (NTP, GPS), which are used as counters. In comparison,
PoWerStore features optimal latency without synchronized
clocks and is the first protocol to implement metadata write-
backs while tolerating Byzantine failures.
Data write-backs are also not needed in case of fast robust
storage implementations that feature single round reads and
writes [15]. Namely, [15] presents fast single-writer crash-
tolerant and BFT storage implementations in which readers
only write metadata while reading data in the single round of
read and hence, without any write-back. However, fast imple-
mentations are fundamentally limited and cannot be optimally
resilient, since the number of required servers is inherently
linear in number of readers [15]. The limitation on the number
of readers of [15] was relaxed in [18], where a single-writer
crash-tolerant robust linearizable storage implementation was
presented, in which most of the reads complete in a single
round, yet a fraction of reads is permitted to be “slow” and
complete in 2 rounds.
Clearly, most BFT storage implementations have been fo-
cusing on using as few servers as possible, ideally 3t+1, which
defines optimal resilience in the Byzantine model [40]. This is
achieved by Phalanx [39], a BFT variant of [6]. Phalanx uses
digital signatures, i.e., self-verifying data, to port [6] to the
Byzantine model, maintaining the latency of [6], as well as its
data write-backs. However, since digital signatures introduce
considerable overhead [37], [42], research attention has shifted
from protocols that employ self-verifying data [9], [34], [38],
[39] to protocols that feature lightweight authentication, or no
data authentication at all (unauthenticated model).
In the unauthenticated model, [3] ruled out the existence
of optimally resilient robust Byzantine fault-tolerant storage
implementation where all write operations finish after a single
communication round. This explained the previous difficulties
in reaching optimal resilience in unauthenticated BFT storage
implementations where several protocols have used 4t + 1
servers [7], [19]. Furthermore, [14] showed the impossibil-
ity of reading from a robust optimally resilient linearizable
storage in two communication rounds; in addition, if WRITE
operations perform a constant number of rounds, even reading
in three rounds is impossible [14]. These results imply that the
optimal latency of a robust optimally resilient and linearizable
BFT storage in the unauthenticated model is 2 rounds for
writes and 4 rounds for reads, even in the single writer case.
This can be achieved by the regular-to-linearizable transforma-
tion of the regular [31] storage protocol of [21]. Hence, it is
not surprising that other robust BFT storage protocols in the
unauthenticated model focused on optimizing common-case
latency with either an unbounded number of read rounds in
the worst case [20], [22] or a number of read rounds dependent
on the number of faulty processes t [4], [40].
Clearly, there is a big gap between storage protocols that
use self-verifying data and those that assume no authentication.
Loft [24] aims at bridging this gap and implements erasure-
coded optimally resilient linearizable storage while optimizing
the failure-free case. Loft uses homomorphic fingerprints and
MACs; it features 3-round wait-free writes, but reads are based
on data write-backs and are only obstruction-free [26], i.e.,
the number of read rounds is unbounded in case of read/write
concurrency. Similarly, our Proofs of Writing (PoW) incor-
porate lightweight authentication that is, however, sufficient
to achieve optimal latency and to facilitate metadata write-
backs. We find PoW to be a fundamental improvement in the
light of BFT storage implementations that explicitly renounce
linearizability in favor of weaker regularity due to the high
cost of data write-backs [8].
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we presented PoWerStore, the first efficient
robust storage protocol that achieves optimal latency, measured
in maximum (worst-case) number of communication rounds
between a client and storage servers, without resorting to
digital signatures. We also separately presented a multi-writer
variant of our protocol called M-PoWerStore. The efficiency of
our proposals stems from combining lightweight cryptography,
erasure coding and metadata writebacks, where readers write-
back only metadata to achieve linearizability. While robust
BFTs have been often criticized for being prohibitively ineffi-
cient, our findings suggest that efficient and robust BFTs can
be realized in practice by relying on lightweight cryptographic
primitives without compromising worst-case performance.
At the heart of both PoWerStore and M-PoWerStore proto-
cols are Proofs of Writing (PoW): a novel storage technique
inspired by commitment schemes in the flavor of [23], that
enables PoWerStore to write and read in 2 rounds in case
of the single-writer PoWerStore which we show optimal.
Similarly, by relying on PoW, M-PoWerStore features 3-round
writes/reads where the third read round is only invoked under
active attacks. Finally, we demonstrated M-PoWerStore’s su-
perior performance compared to existing crash and Byzantine-
tolerant atomic storage implementations.
We point out that our protocols assume unbounded storage
capacity to maintain a version history of the various updates
performed by the writers in the system. We argue, however,
that this limitation is not particular to our proposals and is
inherent to all solutions that rely on erasure-coded data [46].
Note that prior studies have demonstrated that it takes several
weeks to exhaust the capacity of versioning systems [47]; in
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case the storage capacity is bounded, the servers can rely on
efficient garbage collection mechanisms [19] to avoid possible
exhaustion of the storage system.
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APPENDIX
A. Correctness of PoWerStore
Definition A.1 (Valid candidate). A candidate c is valid if
valid(c) holds at some correct server.
Definition A.2 (Timestamps of operations). A READ opera-
tion rd by a correct reader has timestamp ts iff the reader in
rd selected c in line 55 such that c.ts = ts. A WRITE operation
wr has timestamp ts iff the writer increments its timestamp to
ts in line 4.
Lemma A.3 (Validity). Let rd be a completed READ by a
correct reader. If rd returns value V 6= ⊥ then V was written.
Proof: We show that if V is the value decoded in line 76,
then V was indeed written. To show this, we argue that the
fragments used to decode V were written. Note that prior to
decoding V from a set of fragments, the reader establishes the
correctness of each fragment as follows. First, in line 74, the
reader chooses a cross-checksum that was received from t+1
servers. Since one of these servers is correct, the chosen cross-
checksum was indeed written. Secondly, the reader checks in
line 75 that each of the t + 1 fragments used to decode V
hashes to the corresponding entry in the cross-checksum. By
the collision-resistance of H , all fragments that pass this check
were indeed written. Therefore, if V is the value decoded from
these fragments, we conclude that V was written.
Lemma A.4 (Proofs of Writing). If c is a valid candidate,
then there exists a set Q of t + 1 correct servers such that
each server si ∈ Q changed Hist[c.ts] to (fri, cc,H(c.N)).
Proof: If c is valid, then by Definition A.1, valid(c) is true
at some correct server sj . Hence, H(c.N) = Hist[c.ts].NH
holds at sj . By the pre-image resistance of H , no compu-
tationally bounded adversary can acquire c.N from the sole
knowledge of H(c.N). Hence, c.N stems from the writer in
a WRITE operation wr with timestamp c.ts. By Algorithm 1,
line 8, the value of c.N is revealed after the STORE phase in
wr completed. Hence, there exists a set Q of t + 1 correct
servers such that each server si ∈ Q changed Hist[c.ts] to
(fri, cc,H(c.N)).
Lemma A.5 (No exclusion). Let c be a valid candidate and
let rd be a READ by a correct reader that includes c in C
during COLLECT. Then c is never excluded from C.
Proof: As c is valid, by Lemma A.4 a there exists a set Q
of t+ 1 correct servers such that each server si ∈ Q changed
Hist[c.ts] to (∗, ∗, H(c.N)). Hence, valid(c) is true at every
server in Q. Thus, no server in Q replies with a timestamp
ts < c.ts in line 41. Therefore, at most S − t − 1 = 2t
timestamps received by the reader in the FILTER phase are
lower than c.ts, and so c is never excluded from C.
Lemma A.6 (READ/WRITE Atomicity). Let rd be a com-
pleted READ by a correct reader. If rd follows some complete
WRITE(V ), then rd does not return a value older than V .
Proof: If ts is the timestamp of WRITE(V ), it is sufficient to
show that the timestamp of rd is not lower than ts. To prove
this, we show that ∃c′ ∈ C such that (i) c′.ts ≥ ts and (ii) c′
is never excluded from C.
By the time WRITE(V ) completes, t+1 correct servers hold
in lc a candidate whose timestamp is ts or greater. According
to lines 26, 31 of Algorithm 2, a correct server never changes
lc to a candidate with a lower timestamp. Hence, when rd is
invoked, t+1 correct servers hold candidates with timestamp
ts or greater in lc. Hence, during the COLLECT phase in rd,
some candidate received from a correct server with timestamp
ts or greater is inserted in C. Such a candidate is necessarily
valid because either the server received it directly from the
writer, or the server checked its integrity in line 30. Let c′
be the valid candidate with the highest timestamp in C. Then
by Lemma A.5, c′ is never excluded from C. By line 55, no
candidate c such that c.ts < c′.ts is selected. Since c′.ts ≥ ts,
no candidate with a timestamp lower than ts is selected in rd.
Lemma A.7 (READ atomicity). Let rd and rd′ be two
completed read operations by correct readers. If rd′ follows
rd that returns V , then rd′ does not return a value older than
V .
Proof: If c is the candidate selected in rd, it is sufficient
to show that the timestamp of rd′ is not lower than c.ts. We
argue that C contains a candidate c′ such that (i) c′.ts ≥ c.ts
and (ii) c′ is never excluded from C.
By the time rd completes, t + 1 correct servers hold c in
LC. As c was selected in rd in line 55, some correct server
asserted that c is valid in line 30. According to Algorithm 2,
if a correct server excludes c from LC in line 32, then the
server changed lc to a valid candidate with timestamp c.ts or
greater in line 31. Consequently, t+ 1 correct servers hold in
LC∪{lc} a valid candidate with timestamp c.ts or greater. As
such, during COLLECT in rd′, a valid candidate c′ such that
c′.ts ≥ c.ts is included in C, and by Lemma A.5, c′ is never
excluded from C. By line 55, no candidate with a timestamp
lower than c′.ts is selected. Since c′.ts ≥ c.ts, no candidate
with a timestamp lower than c.ts is selected in rd′.
Theorem A.8 (Atomicity). Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 are atomic.
Proof: This proof follows directly from Lem-
mas A.3 A.6 A.7.
We now proceed to proving wait-freedom.
Theorem A.9 (Wait-freedom). Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 are
wait-free.
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Proof: We show that no operation invoked by a correct
client ever blocks. The wait-freedom argument of the WRITE is
straightforward; in every phase, the writer awaits acks from the
least number S−t of correct servers. The same argument holds
for the COLLECT phase of the READ. Hence, in the remainder
of the proof, we show that no READ blocks in the FILTER
phase. By contradiction, consider a READ rd by reader r that
blocks during the FILTER phase after receiving FILTER ACK
messages from all correct servers. We distinguish two cases:
(Case 1) C includes a valid candidate and (Case 2) C includes
no valid candidate.
• Case 1: Let c be the highest valid candidate included in
C. We show that highcand(c) ∧ safe(c) holds. Since c
is valid, by Lemma A.4, there exists a set Q of t + 1
correct servers such that each server si ∈ Q changed
Hist[c.ts] to (fri, cc,H(c.N)). Thus, during the FILTER
phase, valid(c) holds at every server in Q. As no valid
candidate in C has a higher timestamp than c, (i) all
servers si ∈ Q (at least t+1) responded with timestamp
c.ts, corresponding erasure coded fragment fri, cross-
checksum cc in line 41 and (ii) all correct servers (at
least S − t) responded with timestamps at most c.ts. By
(i), c is safe. By (ii), every c′ ∈ C such that c′.ts > c.ts
became invalid and was excluded from C, implying that
c is highcand.
• Case 2: Here, we show that C = ∅. As none of the
candidates in C is valid, during the FILTER phase, the
integrity check in line 30 failed for every candidate in
C at all correct servers. Hence, at least S − t servers
responded with timestamp ts0. Since ts0 is lower than
any candidate timestamp, all candidates were classified
as invalid and were excluded from C.
Theorem A.10 (Latency). Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 feature a
latency of two communication rounds for the WRITE and two
for the READ.
Proof: By Algorithm 1, the WRITE completes after two
phases, STORE and COMPLETE, each taking one communi-
cation round. By Algorithm 3, the READ completes after two
phases, COLLECT and FILTER, each incurring one communi-
cation round.
B. Correctness of M-PoWerStore
Definition A.11 (Valid candidate). A candidate c is valid iff
valid(c) is true at some correct server.
Definition A.12 (Timestamps of operations). A READ op-
eration rd by a non-malicious reader has timestamp ts iff
the reader in rd selected c in line 145 such that c.ts = ts.
A WRITE operation wr has timestamp ts iff the CLOCK
procedure in wr returned ts in line 87.
Lemma A.13 (Validity). Let rd be a completed READ by a
correct reader. If rd returns value V 6= ⊥ then V was written.
Proof: We show that if V is the value decoded in line 167,
then V was indeed written. To show this, we argue that the
fragments used to decode V were written. Note that prior to
decoding V from a set of fragments, the reader establishes the
correctness of each fragment as follows. First, in line 165, the
reader chooses a cross-checksum that was received from t+1
servers. Since one of these servers is correct, the chosen cross-
checksum was indeed written. Secondly, the reader checks in
line 166 that each of the t + 1 fragments used to decode V
hashes to the corresponding entry in the cross-checksum. By
the collision-resistance of H , all fragments that pass this check
were indeed written. Therefore, if V is the value decoded from
these fragments, we conclude that V was written.
Lemma A.14 (WRITE atomicity). Let op be a completed
operation by a correct client and let wr be a completed WRITE
such that op precedes wr. If tsop and tswr are the timestamps
of op and wr respectively, then tswr > tsop.
Proof: By the time op completes, t+1 correct servers hold in
lc a candidate whose timestamp is tsop or greater. According
to lines 117, 124, 129 of Algorithm 5, a correct server never
updates lc with a candidate that has a lower timestamp.
Hence, the writer in wr obtains from the CLOCK procedure a
timestamp that is greater or equal to tsop from some correct
server si. Let c be the candidate held in lc by server si, and let
c.ts be the timestamp reported to the writer. We now argue that
c.ts is not fabricated. To see why, note that prior to overwriting
lc with c in line 124 (resp. 129), server si checks that c is
valid in line 123 (resp. 129). The valid predicate as defined
in line 132 subsumes an integrity check for c.ts. Hence, c.ts
passes the integrity check in line 102; according to the WRITE
algorithm, tswr ≥ (c.ts.num+ 1, ∗, ∗) > c.ts ≥ tsop.
Lemma A.15 (Proofs of Writing). If c is a valid candidate,
then there exists a set Q of t+1 correct servers such that each
server si ∈ Q changed Hist[c.ts] to (fri, cc,H(c.N), vec).
Proof: If c is valid, then by Definition A.11, valid(c) is
true at some correct server sj . Hence, either H(c.N) =
Hist[c.ts].NH or verify(c.vec[j], c.ts,H(c.N), kj) must hold
at sj . By the pre-image resistance of H , no computationally
bounded adversary can acquire c.N from the sole knowledge
of H(c.N). Hence, c.N stems from some writer in a WRITE
operation wr with timestamp c.ts. By Algorithm 4, line 92,
the value of c.N is revealed after the STORE round in wr
completed. Hence, there exists a set Q of t + 1 correct
servers such that each server si ∈ Q changed Hist[c.ts] to
(fri, cc,H(c.N), vec).
Lemma A.16 (No exclusion). Let c be a valid candidate and
let rd be a READ by a correct reader that includes c in C
during COLLECT. Then c is never excluded from C.
Proof: As c is valid, by Lemma A.15 a there exists a set Q
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of t+ 1 correct servers such that each server si ∈ Q changed
Hist[c.ts] to (∗, ∗, H(c.N), vec). Hence, validByHist(c) is
true at every server in Q. Thus, no server in Q replies
with a timestamp ts < c.ts in line 127. Therefore, at most
S − t − 1 = 2t timestamps received by the reader in the
FILTER round are lower than c.ts, and so c is never excluded
from C.
Lemma A.17 (READ/WRITE Atomicity). Let rd be a com-
pleted READ by a correct reader. If rd follows some complete
WRITE(V ), then rd does not return a value older than V .
Proof: If ts is the timestamp of WRITE(V ), it is sufficient to
show that the timestamp of rd is not lower than ts. To prove
this, we show that ∃c′ ∈ C such that (i) c′.ts ≥ ts and (ii) c′
is never excluded from C.
By the time WRITE(V ) completes, t+1 correct servers hold
in lc a candidate whose timestamp is ts or greater. According
to lines 117, 124, 129 of Algorithm 5, a correct server never
changes lc to a candidate with a lower timestamp. Hence,
when rd is invoked, t+1 correct servers hold candidates with
timestamp ts or greater in lc. Hence, during COLLECT in rd,
some candidate received from a correct server with timestamp
ts or greater is inserted in C. Such a candidate is necessarily
valid by the integrity checks in lines 123, 129. Let c′ be the
valid candidate with the highest timestamp in C. Then by
Lemma A.16, c′ is never excluded from C. By line 145, no
candidate c such that c.ts < c′.ts is selected. Since c′.ts ≥ ts,
no candidate with a timestamp lower than ts is selected in rd.
Lemma A.18. (READ atomicity). Let rd and rd′ be two
completed read operations by correct readers. If rd′ follows
rd that returns V , then rd′ does not return a value older than
V .
Proof: If c is the candidate selected in rd, it is sufficient
to show that the timestamp of rd′ is not lower than c.ts. We
argue that C contains a candidate c′ such that (i) c′.ts ≥ c.ts
and (ii) c′ is never excluded from C.
As c is selected in rd in line 145 only if safe(c) holds,
some correct server verified the integrity of c.ts and c.N in
line 125. In addition, in REPAIR, the reader in rd checks the
integrity of c.vec. We distinguish two cases:
• Case 1: If c.vec passes the integrity check in line 171,
then the integrity of c has been fully established. Hence,
by the time rd completes, t+1 correct servers validated
c in line 123 and changed lc to c or to a higher valid
candidate.
• Case 2: If vector c.vec fails the integrity check in
line 171, then in REPAIR, c is repaired in line 172 and
subsequently written back to t+1 correct servers. Hence,
by the time rd completes, t+1 correct servers validated
c in line 129 and changed lc to c or to a higher valid
candidate.
Consequently, in the COLLECT round in rd′ a valid candidate
c′ such that c′.ts ≥ c is included in C, and by Lemma A.16,
c′ is never excluded from C. By line 145, no candidate with
a timestamp lower than c′ is selected. Since c′.ts ≥ c.ts, no
candidate with a timestamp lower than c.ts is selected in rd′.
Theorem A.19 (Atomicity). Algorithms 4, 5 and 6 are atomic.
Proof: This proof follows directly from Lem-
mas A.13 A.14 A.17 A.18.
We now proceed to proving wait-freedom.
Theorem A.20 (Wait-freedom). Algorithms 4, 5,and 6 are
wait-free.
Proof: We show that no operation invoked by a correct
client ever blocks. The wait-freedom argument of the WRITE is
straightforward; in every round, the writer awaits acks from the
least number S−t of correct servers. The same argument holds
for the COLLECT and the REPAIR rounds of the READ. Hence,
in the remainder of the proof, we show that no READ blocks
in the FILTER round. By contradiction, consider a READ rd by
reader r that blocks during the FILTER round after receiving
FILTER ACK messages from all correct servers. We distinguish
two cases: (Case 1) C includes a valid candidate and (Case
2) C includes no valid candidate.
• Case 1: Let c be the highest valid candidate included in
C. We show that highcand(c) ∧ safe(c) holds. Since c is
valid, by Lemma A.15, there exists a set Q of t+1 correct
servers such that each server si ∈ Q changed Hist[c.ts]
to (fri, cc,H(c.N), vec). Thus, during the FILTER round,
validByHist(c) holds at every server in Q. As no valid
candidate in C has a higher timestamp than c, (i) all
servers si ∈ Q (at least t+1) responded with timestamp
c.ts, corresponding erasure coded fragment fri, cross-
checksum cc and repair vector vec in line 127 and (ii) all
correct servers (at least S−t) responded with timestamps
at most c.ts. By (i), c is safe. By (ii), every c′ ∈ C such
that c′.ts > c.ts became invalid and was excluded from
C, implying that c is highcand.
• Case 2: Here, we show that C = ∅. As none of the
candidates in C is valid, during FILTER, the integrity
check in line 125 failed for every candidate in C at all
correct servers. Hence, at least S − t servers responded
with timestamp ts0. Since ts0 is lower than any candidate
timestamp, all candidates were classified as invalid and
were excluded from C.
Theorem A.21 (Non-skipping Timestamps). Algorithms 4, 5
and 6 implement non-skipping timestamps.
Proof: By construction, a fabricated timestamp would fail
the check in line 102. Hence, no fabricated timestamp is ever
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used in a WRITE. The Lemma then directly follows from the
algorithm of WRITE.
Theorem A.22 (Latency). Algorithms 4, 5 and 6 feature a
latency of three communication rounds for the WRITE and two
for the READ in the absence of attacks. In the worst case, the
READ latency is three communication rounds.
Proof: By Algorithm 4, the WRITE completes after three
rounds, CLOCK, STORE and COMPLETE, each taking one com-
munication round. In the absence of attacks, by Algorithm 6,
the READ completes after two rounds, COLLECT and FILTER,
each taking one communication round. Under BigMac [13]
attacks the READ may go to the REPAIR round, incurring one
additional communication round.
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